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ABSTRACT
Observing project evaluation methods differ depending on
the point of view, this thesis is concerned with how the
different evaluation methods lead to the different results
and what the implication of the different evaluation
results will be to the decision making process about a
project which involves intensive interactions between
the private and the public sector. Net Present Value
method, from the private sector point of view, Social
Cost Benefit Analysis from society point of view, and
Economic Impact Assessment from a local government point
of view are examined in terms of their economic rationale,
technical procedure and interpretation of analytical results.
One of the important issues is the choice of an
appropriate discount rate. The extensive review of
literature reveals that there are no dominant views about
3the public discount rates. Consideration of risk and
economic efficiency suggests the public sector should
use "social discount rates" although no attempts have ever
been made to measure them.
An urban 'redevelopment project is chosen as an example
to actually apply these evaluation methods, since it
usually involves intensive interactions among a private
developer, a local government, and the State/Federal govern-
ment. Park Plaza Urban Renewal Project in Boston is
studied as a numerical example. Although there are serious
difficulties to obtain data necessary to conduct serious
analysis since some items do not have market prices and
other items have distorted market prices, the case study
provides very interesting findings as well as general
directions of analytical procedure. First, there can exist
"zero-sum" relation between a city and a developer which
lead them to a fertile negotiation, however, the State/
Federal government may solve the problem between the two,
making every party better off. Secondly, "tax surplus"
role of a local government may not be able to make even
its constituents better off due to external diseconomies.
Carliss Baldwin, Assistant Professor of Finance
William Wheaton, Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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7CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Project Evaluation can mean different concepts
depending on the point of view to a project. From the
private sector point of view, Project Evaluation simply
means to find whethera project can bring more money than
it will spend. From the society point of view, Project
Evaluation should measure real benefits and costs to the
society which differs from market prices in the economy.
From a local government point of view, Project Evaluation
means to assess the impacts of a project on its constituency.
Accordingly, a project may appear differently depending
on from which point of view it is being analyzed.
In case a project involves intensive interactions
between the public sector and the private sector, this
difference in the ways to analyze the same project is of
great significance.
Recognizing there are three distinctive methods,
Chapter II examines the Net Present Value Method which is
often used by the private sector, Social Cost Benefit
Analysis which is used by economists or the government
8analysts, and Economic Impact Assessment which is used by
a local government. The underlying economic rationale of
each method, the way to measure benefits (profits) and
costs are discussed.
In Chapter III we review the literature about the
public and private discount rates and then suggest what
might be appropriate discount rate for each method.
In Chapter IV, an urban redevelopment project is chosen
as an example to be analyzed by the three methods. Some
modifications are suggested to apply the general methods
to a specific project.
A case study, Park Plaza Urban Renewal Project in
B.oston, is presented in Chapter V. We will evaluate this
particular project from three different points of view
and see the- consequences of their interactions.
Finally, recommendations and conclusion are discussed
in Chapter VI.
9CHAPTER II
PROJECT EVALUATION METHODS
In general, the purpose of project evaluation is
to identify and measure the benefits and costs of a
project so as to help decision makers in capital invest-
ment problems. However, depending on the point of view,
there are three distinctive methods. The Net Present
Value method assesses the profitability of a project for
the private sector; economic and social impact assessment
measures the impacts of a project from a local government
point of view; and social cost-benefit analysis focuses
on the benefits and costs of society as a whole. Each
of these techniques and its economic rationale will be
discussed below.
1. Net Present Value Method
When evaluating capital investment projects, private
firms can use the Net Present Value (NPV) method. It
is considered to be the best method to reach optimal
investment decisions. The rule itself is the following:
10
1. Forecast a project's incremental after-tax cash
flow.
2. Select an appropriate discount rate according
to the risk characteristics of the project.
3. Calculate the NPV of the project by using the
formula:
n C
NPV = t
t=o (l+i)t
where i = discount rate
Ct = cash flow
4. Under no capital constraints
- Accept any project if NPV is positive
under capital constraints.
NPV
- Accept projects with the highest cos ratio
cost'
until funds become exhausted.
Assuming a perfect capital market and mutually
independent projects, the above rule for investment
decisions is universally correct.2 By accepting projects
with positive NPVs firms can increase their own market
values, thereby increasing their shareholders' wealth
and maximizing their utility.
1.1 Economic Rationale of NPV Method
We can see Fisher's solution to demonstrate why the
NPV method can give optimal investment criteria. Assuming
a perfect capital market without uncertainty and equal
11
lending and borrowing rates which are determined by
aggregate supply and demand of cash for consumption,
Fisher's solution considers an investment-consumption
problem over two periods of time. The present (today)
and some future time (tomorrow).
In Figure 1, the horizontal axis labeled K represents
the amount of actual or potential income available for
consumption today. The vertical axis K1 represents the
amount of income available tomorrow. Now suppose the
individual has a cash flow of R today and R' tomorrow.
His wealth corresponds to the point R" on his budget line
QQ' (Capital Market Line) which has a slope representing
the lending and borrowing rate. This individual's decision
problem now is to choose an optimal time pattern of
consumption within the opportunities available to him
on the line QQ'. The existence of a capital market enables
him to choose any point on the line QQ' through borrowing
or lending.
Introduction at an investment opportunity now enables
him to invest today's consumption and get tomorrow's
consumption which is higher than returns in the capital
market. The curve QV, called the "production possibility
frontier," is the locus of all possible combinations of
consumptions (KOK ) -- his wealth-- and the slope of a
tangent at a point on the curve represents the marginal
12
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rate of return on investment of today's consumption into
production. An individual will borrow money until he gets
to point Q then start to invest today's cash into a
production opportunity, since he can get more future
consumption by investing until he gets to point S" than
he can get by lending in the capital market. At point S"
the marginal rate of return on investment equals the rate
of interest. It is at this point that he can reach his
highest wealth. Beyond point S" he can not get more
return than from the capital market. Thus, once he gets
the wealth corresponding to the point S" -- S for today
and S' for tomorrow's consumption-- he should start borrow-
ing and lending so that he can get to the point where he
can satisfy his preference for consumption today vs.
consumption tomorrow. Graphically, this is the point
where the highest possible indifference curve of his utility
touches the capital market line PP'.
In summary, to arrive at the optimal investment-
consumption decision an individual who seeks to maximize
his utility can follow this two step strategy: first,
maximize his wealth through investing to a production
opportunity; the more the wealth, the higher the utility.
Second, from the optimal production point, borrow or lend
along the capital market line to achieve the point of
maximum utility.
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The implication of this economic solution to the NPV
rule is straightforward: the intercepts of the capital
market lines with the K axis give the present value of0
an individual's wealth, since it gives the maximum amount
he can spend today through the capital market transaction.
Given market interest rate i, the intercept can be
K1
expressed, in general, as K + 1+i which is equal to
formula for present value if i is the appropriate discount
rate. The NPV of investment is the difference between
the present value at initial wealth and the present value
of terminal wealth which is, in this example, PO - QO = PQ.
When the capital market line touches the production
frontiers at the point S" the NPV is maximized, since
beyond this point the present value of wealth starts to
decrease. This decrease suggests any further projects
will have negative NPVs. Therefore, investing up to the
optimal point is actually equivalent to accepting all
projects whose NPVs are positive. In this way, using
the NPV can help an individual to achieve his highest
possible utility.
Although this analysis is based on the assumption
of a perfectly competitive capital market with certainty
and restricted to two periods of time, a similar analysis
is said to hold under uncertainty and over any number
of time periods. Moreover, the assumption of a perfectly
15
competitive capital market is plausible since research
work indicates, in general, that the capital market
functions fairly well.3
Fisher's solution also demonstrates the important
point that the capital investment decision criterion has
nothing to do with investors' preferences for current vs.
future consumptions. This separation of investment and
consumption decisions enables investors to hire professional
managers or analysts and ask them to increase the market
value of their wealth. This task will be done by adopting
investment opportunities with positive NPVs regardless
of an investor's specific time preference.
On the other hand, an investor does not need to know
production technology nor the optimal investment mix of
how much to invest today. He only has to choose the inter-
temporal consumption pattern according to his own time
preference.
Consequently, we can say, (1) the NPV method can
offer investment criteria that are optimal in the sense
of maximizing an investor's utility in most circumstances,4
and (2) the NPV method permits decentralized decision
making since it can be used by a manager or analyst regard-
less of an investor's time preference or utility function.
16
2. Social Cost Benefit Analysis
Social Cost Benefit Analysis (SCBA) was developed
as a response to the needs of public sector decision makers
for an explicit and rational method of evaluating public
projects in order to arrive at the optimal investment
decisions. Although the process is similar to the NPV
method, SCBA measures the costs and benefits of a project
from society's point of view rather than a private
investor's point of view. The objective of SCBA is to
guide decisions so that resources can be allocated for
production and consumption in a way that maximizes "social
welfare."
The analysis will proceed as follows:
1. Identify all real benefits and costs to society
brought about by a project.
2. Measure them in monetary terms by using prices
which reflect social values of goods and services.
Use "shadow prices" whenever necessary; take into
account externalities properly.
3. Choose an appropriate discount rate and find the
NPV of benefit-cost stream.
4. Under no capital constrainst;
- Accept any project if NPV is positive.
Under capital constraints;
- Accept' projects with the highest NPV ratio
COST
until funds become exhausted.
17
.2.1 Economic rationale of Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
The above description raises the question of what
"social welfare" means and whether SCBA can really help
us to maximize it. Welfare economics concerns the impact
of economic activities on social welfare, where social
welfare is considered to be a function of individual
utilities. In general,
SW =[U, U . . .,U.,. . .,U]
where U.: utility of lth individual
U. is a function of the 4th individual's
consumption.
The formulation of a social welfare function depends
on the judgment of how to relate an individual's utility
to the social welfare. One of the important concepts of
welf-are economics, called Pareto's criterion, assumed that
interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible. By
this criterion we will unanimously support a project if
someone gains and nobody loses. If society reaches a
state where no one can be better off without someone else
being worse off, no more improvement of social welfare
can be achieved. This ultimate social state is defined
as "Pareto Optimality." This concept has the advantage
of being free from any value judgment.
18
However, often in the real world some people gain
from a project while others lose. Thus, faced with this
situation, we need a way of making judgments that goes
beyond Pareto's criterion.
One attempt to ease this impractical nature of Pareto's
criterion is called Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle,
which says a social state y is socially preferable to
a social state x if those who gain from the more from x
to y can compensate those who lose yet still keep some
gains for themselves. The idea of "Pareto Optimality"
appears to be preserved because the losers can remain
as well off as before by compensation while gainers are
obviously better off. "It is just this principle which
underlies Cost Benefit analysis"5 since if the project
has net benefits, i.e. the monetary value of benefits
exceeds costs, the social state can be improved because
the gainers can hypothetically compensate the losers and
still have some gains left over. So far so good, but a
problem arises if compensation will not be paid. We.
analysts or decision makers then have to compare the
utility of gainers with the utility of losers in order
to judge whether a social state will really be improved
or not. Then, if gains exceed losses we have to provide
the mechanism to redistribute the gains so as to compensate
the losses. Otherwise, SCBA may or may not maximize social
welfare.
19
What SCBA actually does is to add up the monetary
value of benefits and costs of a project regardless who
gets and who loses. This process makes the implicit
assumption that the marginal utility of income is equal
for any individual in the society, or equivalently, the
prevailing income/wealth distribution is fair. Thus each
additional $1 is equally valuable to everybody. This
assumption may not be acceptable, since the marginal utility
of income might depend on one's wealth and people in the
society do not possess the same amount of wealth.
Furthermore, SCBA does not say anything about the mechanism
for benefits redistribution. Consequently, SCBA may not
be helpful for maximizing social welfare since it does
not handle distributional problems properly.
On the other hand, SCBA can be helpful for achieving
higher economic efficiency. As Fisher's solution suggests,
to accept all projects with positive NPV of benefit-cost
stream will insure that society can increase its wealth
to the higher level. However, SCBA needs to use the real
social value of goods and services rather than the market
prices. By adjusting the distortions- of market prices
and correctly measuring externalities, goods and services
must be valued so that their prices are exactly equal to
their marginal costs to the society as well as to their
marginal benefits to the society. It is argued that
20
under this ideal price structure with a competitive economy,
the output will be maximized, the input will be minimized
and the economy will be reaching to the equilibrium with
efficiency property, where "you can't make any one man
better off without hurting some other man."6 The SCBA
method appears to help us reach this Pareto Efficiency
7Optimality but in a limited sense.
In summary, it is uncertain whether SCBA can help us
achieve improvements in social welfare according to Pareto's
criterion because the assumption of the current income/
wealth distribution being fair may not be correct. On
the other hand, it appears SCBA can help society to achieve
more wealth through more efficient resource allocation,
if it uses prices correctly reflecting social value. The
problem remains that social welfare considerations and
economic efficiency may conflict.
One way to handle this possible conflict is to set
some distributional weights depending on who gets and who
loses, in other words, depending on each individual's
marginal utility of income. If the poor will get the
benefits, we will assign higher weights since the poor
likely have higher marginal utility of income than the
rich. However, it may not be easy to identify who will
gain and who will lose and furthermore, there is no
accurate method to measure one's marginal utility of
21
income and hence weights to be used. These methodological
problems raise the question whether it is worthwhile to
sacrifice economic efficiency for this somewhat arbitrary
weights assignments method.
This paper agrees with Mishan's argument in that a
benefit-cost analysis should be strictly limited to
consideration of economic efficiency; economists should
not try to qualify the essentially ethical and political
trade-offs relating to income distribution. By the same
token, benefit-cost analysis should not be the sole
criterion for making decisions about government investments. 8
Income/wealth distribution problems should be analyzed
separately by other methods, since the choice between
economic efficiency and fair income/wealth distribution
is essentially a matter of an individual's value judgment
and analytical methods should not be biased by any value
judgments. It should be a decision maker who makes a
value judgment.
Consequently, it is suggested that SCBA can be
helpful to achieve higher economic efficiency, but is
not appropriate to handle income/wealth distribution
problems.
22
2.2 Benefit and Cost Measurement
It has been pointed out that SCBA should use the
prices which correctly reflect the real social value of
resources. Real social value of resources cannot always
be represented by market prices, specifically, government
intervention (e.g., tax, price control), imperfect
competition (e.g., monopoly), unemployment of resources,
and externalities lead to divergences between market prices
and real costs and benefits to society. It is also impor-
tant to distinguish between "real" costs and benefits vs.
"transfer" or "distributional" payments. SCBA only takes
"real" costs and benefits into account.
A. Shadow Prices
Shadow prices, defined as the opportunity costs of
economic resources used in a project should be used in
cases where market prices do not reflect true costs of
the resources due to government actions, monopoly or
unemployment of resources. For example, if ferry rates
are set well above the marginal costs of providing the
ferry service because of monopoly, the benefit of a bridge
construction project which will eliminate the ferry business
is thus not the payment to the ferry service that consumers
have had to pay. The real cost saving to the society is
the marginal cost of the ferry services. Monopoly rent
23
which is the difference between the market rate and the
marginal cost of the ferry service, should be excluded
from the calculation because it is not a payment for a
real resource but a transfer payment. Generally, tax
payments or subsidies are also considered as transfer
payments, not as real costs. Hence, all output should
be valued without including taxes and subsidies.9
Serious unemployment in an economy with rigid wage
rates will serve as another example of shadow prices.
In this case, the shadow price or opportunity cost of labor
might be considered to be zero, since without the project
a worker might not be hired and might produce nothing.
B. Externalities
The existence of externalities may be the critical
issue of SCBA, since externalities often account for the
basic difference between private and public project evalu-
ation. An externality will be said to exist whenever
a) economic activity in the form of production or
consumption affects the production or utility levels
of other producers or consumers.
b) the effect is unpriced or uncompensated.1 0
Externalities of a project, whether positive, such as
reduction in road congestion due to the opening of a
new subway, or negative such as increase in pollutants
24
in river water due to a chemical plant construction are
normally not considered in private project evaluations
because they are not priced. This is the major source of
divergence between private costs and social costs.
The distinction between technological externalities
and pecuniary externalities as discussed by McKean is
very important. Technological externalities occur when
the production functions of the affected producer or the
utility function of the affected consumers, is altered.
They reflect real gains or losses in terms of physical
production or an individual's utility. On the other hand,
pecuniary externalities reflect only transfers from one
section of the economy to another via changes in relative
prices. An example of pecuniary externalities is when
the improvement of a road leads to greater profitability
of the garages and restaurants on that road, employment
of more labor by them, etc. In general, this will not be
an additional benefit to be credited to the road investment,
even if the extra profitability, etc., of the garages
on one road is not offset by lower profitability at garages
on other roads which are now less used as a result of the
traffic diversion. Any net difference in profitability
is simply a reflection of the benefits of more journeys
than before and it would be double counting if these were
included, too. It is usually argued that only
25
technological externalities are relevant to a cost benefit
analysis, and that the purely transfer or distributional
items should be eliminated from the evaluation.
C. Valuation of Non-Market Items
Externalities
It is argued that externalities arise because of the
failure to define and enforce property rights of certain
goods and services. Free goods, like air, are an example.
By this argument, the valuation of externalities can be
resolved by a definition and enforcement of property rights.
The "compensation equivalent" concept assumes the producer
has the property rights to consume. Then the price of
externalities corresponds to the willingness of consumers
to pay for stopping a negative effects. The "equivalent
valuation" concept, on the other hand, assumes that the
consumers initially have the property rights of natural
environments. Thus the price quoted must be the compensation
which consumers would require in exchange for giving
permission for the negative effects to be produced. The
equivalent valuation tends to exceed the compensation
equivalent.
26
Public Good
Theoretically the value of a public good can be
measured by the consumer's willingness to pay for it.
However, its two characteristics
1. Non-excludability (nobody can be excluded)
2. Non-rivalry in consumption (everybody can consume
without expense of other consumers)
give people an economic rationale not to reveal their
true preferences. For example, they will profit by
appearing to dislike pollution more than they really do,
or they will understate preferences for positive
externalities of public goods to reduce their payments
(the "free rider" problem). Thus it seems fair to say
that no clear-cut procedure exists to guide the cost-
12benefit analysis in the evaluation of public good.
Intangibles
Some costs and benefits (such as the visual effect
of new buildings) can not be quantified, and others
although they can be quantified, can not be valued in
monetary terms (e.g., a reduction in crime rate due to
an urban redevelopment). Such costs and benefits have
been called intangible costs and benefits. One possible
approach may be to try to guess the value of intangibles
from the money people who will have to pay for goods
27
which seem to have equal value to them, e.g., the attempt
to value the public education program by the price of
private education. Consumer questionnaires about
willingness to pay for intangibles may be helpful but
the questionnaires can be notoriously unreliable. 1 3
Whenever benefits can not be valued in any way,
it is still useful to compare the costs of alternative
ways of providing the same benefits. This is called
cost-effectiveness analysis and is regularly used in
defense, public health and other fields. The real danger
to avoid is ignoring gains and losses simply because
they can not be valued. To make important policy decisions
on only the dollar amounts that can be computed, just
because they are the only dollar amounts, would be most
dangerous. The under-estimation of the most truly
distinctive benefits of the program might be crucial.1 4
D. Non-Marginal Changes
When the projects are large enough to affect market
prices the benefits accruing from investment can not
be measured by multiplying the additional quantities
of output either by the old or the new price. The old
price would give an over-estimate and the new price an
under-estimate. What we should measure is the increase
in consumer surplus with a demand curve. If we assume
28
that the marginal utility of money remains unchanged
and (in other words, the demand curve does not shift),
the demand curve is linear, an average of before and
after prices will be the correctmeasure of the benefit.15
In practice, when project life is long a difficulty
arises because change in population or income will cause
shifts in the demand curve at the same time that price-
reducing investment projects also influence movements
along the demand curve. Although measurement may be
very difficult, it is very important conceptually to
distinguish the effects caused by income and population
changes from the benefits caused by projects.
E. Second Benefits
Suppose there is an irrigation project which results
in an increase in wheat production. The direct or
primary benefits are measured as the value of the increase
in grain output less the associated increase in farmers'
costs. The question is whether we should count
"secondary benefits" such as the value added in
processing wheat into flour, flour into bread, etc.
The answer is that in a properly functioning price
mechanism, the market demand ~for wheat is a derived
demand and so reflects the value of extra bread, etc.
As long as the market prices reflect true marginal
29
social costs, we only have to worry about secondary
benefits when the market price does not exist or diverge
from the social value. Ohterwise, we will double-count
the benefits.
In summary, the SCBA will help us achieve more
wealth and economic efficiency by forcing us to use
the real social value of goods and services rather than
imperfect market prices.. It has been shown how to
adjust the distorted market prices and how to value
non-market benefits and costs. The danger of double-
counting of benefits has also been illustrated. It is
pointed out that SCBA can also guide us to a state of greater
social welfare . Only if we assume that the current
income/wealth distribution is fair, and that a marginal
utility of income is equal for everybody. However,
if we disagree with this value judgement, we have to
make a trade-off between economic efficiency and social
welfare, and SCBA will not be a great help.
3. Economic Impact Assessment
3.1. Environmental Impact Assessment
Whenever a project is likely to have significant
effects on the human environment, an Environmental
Impact Assessment is called for to measure various impacts
of a project on a local community so that a local government
can evaluate the project in a comprehensive way.
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In general, the impacts are classified as follows:
traffic impacts, economic impacts, visual impacts, air
quality impacts, noise level impacts, demographic impacts,
and public utilities impacts. Each of these impacts
is analyzed, then the result is presented to a decision
maker. Looking at the respective analytical results,
the decision maker will determine the relative value
of each of the different impacts, judge trade-offs
among different impacts, and then make a final decision.
This decision-making process is by no means easy
and simple since the decision maker has to compare,
for example, increased tax revenues with a decreased
noise level and determine desirable trade-offs between
the two impacts. The greatest difficulty arises when
he compares several impacts with one another. Although
using the Environmental Impact Assessment method may
be one way to consider project's externalities, it
is too difficult practically for a decision maker to
arrive at a rational and consistent decision rather
than a subjective and inconsistent one. Consequently,
a decision maker generally considers economic impacts
as more significant than the others, since they are
measurable in monetary terms and they have direct impacts
on the financial position of a local government.
31
3.2 Economic Impact Assessment
Economic Impact Assessment (EIA) measures incremental
tax revenues created by a project and public outlays
spent for it. Normally, this analysis should be confined
to those costs funded by property taxes, excluding
those paid by excise taxes, revenue sharing, state
aid, etc., and comparing those costs with revenues
16derived from property taxes.1 The incremental jobs
created (e.g., construction jobs) and their multiplier
effects on a local economy are measured separately.
Although it is not a decisive rule, the more the net
tax revenues or "tax surplus", the better.
Economic Rational of Economic Impact Assessment
The concept underlying EIA is naive. EIA assumes
that both a local government and its constituents benefit
from accepting any projects which have greater tax
flows than project costs, since this enables the local
government to provide better public services without
increasing tax rates.
A local government is very concerned about losing
people and industries. Therefore, competing with other
local governements, it tries to attract as many decent
habitants and industries as possible by providing better
public services and amenities at relatively low tax
rates.
32
There are two problems. First, Economic Impact
Assessment considers solely the impacts in a local
government's own jurisdiction. This implies that a
project which creates positive net revenues in one
jurisdiction at the expense of social costs in other
jurisdictions should be undertaken. In other words,
the creation of "external diseconomy" might be
encouraged. From the point of view of society as a
whole, all benefits and costs have to be considered,
regardless of local jurisdiction; hence EIA can lead
to inefficient resource allocations. For example,
suppose that a project will create a small increase
in property values in one jurisdiction, but at the
same time will create an enormous decrease in property
values in other jurisdictions. The project obviously
should not be accepted from society's point of view
since it will not have a positive NPV of benefits,
but using EIA the local government will accept it.
As another example, the job creation and its multiplier
effect are real social gains only if there exists
unemployment of labor. In a full-employment economy,
to create one more job actually means to displace one
job elsewhere in the economy and so the multiplier
effect will be negligible. Thus, members of one
jurisdiction find themselves seriously affected by
public actions in another jurisdiction and vice versa,
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and at last, everybody may find themselves worse off.
This represents inefficient resource allocation.
The second problem is whether the rule of tax
surplus is of economic significance. The answer may
be no, since tax revenues are not a real benefit although
they may partly reflect the real benefits capitalized
in property values. Hence, it is hard to put any
economic significance on the rule that tax revenues
from a project have to exceed the outlays for it.
In summary, although Economic Impact Assessment
is often done by many local governments, its economic
rationale is questionable. If local governments are
really concerned about the welfare of their constituency,
they all have to agree that every government should
consider inter-jurisdictional external effects of their
public actions. Furthermore, the evaluation of economic
impacts is only one part of total project evaluation.
The other impacts reflecting externalities should be
considered simultaneously. However, it should be noted
that the mere exhibition of various impact results only
confuses a decision maker.
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CHAPTER III
DISCOUNT RATE
We feel that today's $1.00 is not as valuable as
$1.00 one year later, even in real terms. When costs
and benefits occur at different points in time, we have
to discount them and find the present value of that
benefits and costs stream. The choice of discount rates
is very critical to project evaluations since decisions
are often sensitive to discount rates. Starting from
private discount rates, we will proceed to a more
controversial issue -- public and social discount rates.
1. Private Risk Adjusted Discount Rate
The NPV method can help a private investor fulfill
his ultimate goal -- to maximize his utility through
maximizing his wealth. This is shown in Chapter II.
Now we will examine how to find the appropriate discount
rate to use.
As the Fisher's solution has shown, in a perfect
capital market without uncertainty, only one marginal
rate of return on investment exists in equilibrium.
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Moreover, this rate is also equal to the interest rate
which represents an individual's time preference. Hence,
it is obvious this rate is appropriate for the discount
rate.
However, in the real world of uncertainty and an
imperfect capital market, things are not so simple. The
major difference is due to the introduction of risk to
investment problems. We can actually observe various
rates of return on investment depending on the risk
characteristics of the investments. The individual's
time preference will be expressed as a risk-free interest
rate which can be approximated by the rate of long-term
government bonds. However, this rate is absolutely
not equal to other rates of return on risky investments.
Current finance theory holds that there exists an
17
optimal portfolio investment strategy based on an
individual's utility with respect to risk. The extension
of this theory suggests an equilibrium will be achieved
through the capital market mechanism with respect to
risk-return trade-offs. In other words, an investment
project with a particular risk characteristic will be
priced so as to correspond to the one expected rate of
return in equilibrium. This rate, the required after-tax
expected rate of return on the investment, is an
appropriate discount rate since it correctly reflects the
opportunity cost of capital for the investment.
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This risk-return trade-off in equilibrium is
depicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
rk i+ k (rm
rk: required expected rate or return on security k
i: risk-free interest rate
rm: expected rate of return on market portfolio
k : "market sensitivity" which measures the
"isensitivity" of the returns on security k to
the returns on the market portfolio
rk is called the risk adjusted discount rate of security k,
can be considered as a measure of risk of security k,
but it only reflects "systematic" risk of security k.
The distinction between systematic and unsystematic risk
is very important. Unsystematic risk is not correlated
with the market while systematic risk is. Unsystematic
risk can be eliminated by diversification of an investment
portfolio since if you invest in various securities with
various risk characteristics, the random nature of
unsystematic risks will cause each of them to wash-out.
Therefore, assuming investors can diversify their
investments without any constraints, only the systematic
risks of securities are relevant.
Although the CAPM was developed through observing
the stock market, we can also use this model with some
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modifications to find an appropriate discount rate for
investment projects. First, it is necessary to identify
the risk characteristics of a project and find the company
whose business seems to bear a similar risk to the project
being considered. Then the 6 of that company's stock can
be found from the stock market data. One problem that
arises is that stock 6 reflects not only the business
risk caused by what the company is doing, but also the
financial risk caused by the way the company is financed.
As we might expect, the higher the debt, the higher the
financial risk. Hence the next step is to separate
business risks and financial risks. The formula is as
follows:
ASSET = EQUITY Equity
Equity + (1 - T) Debt
where
EQUITY =STOCK
T = corporate income tax rate.
In other words, 3ASSET measures the business risk
only. SASSET is the 1STOCK of the company if it is 100%
equity financed. It is this 3ASSET which is relevant
for evaluating the project. Thus it should be plugged
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into the CAPM formula to find the appropriate risk-adjusted
discount rate for the project. In this way it is
recommended first to evaluate the project using business
risk only, then to consider financing strategy. Finally,
we should pay attention to a limitation of the CAPM, that
is, it essentially depicts the relation which holds over
two-periods of time, assuming a perfect capital market.
However, it can give a fair approximation of the
appropriate discount rate in most circumstances. 1 8
2. Public and Social Discount Rates
There seems no dominant position among economists
about public and social discount rates. Further, the
concepts themselves are not well-defined. In this paper,
"public discount rates" will be used in the same sense
as "public sector discount rates" which means the discount
rate to be used for public investment projects by the
public sector. On the other hand, "social discount
rates" means the discount rate to be applied to evaluate
any projects -- either public or private -- from society's
point of view. This definition is very useful because
(1) there is a large amount of literature about "public
sector discount rates" but not about "social discount
rates", and (2) the distinction between the two will be
consistent with the distinction between social and public
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sector point of view. First we will review the
literature of public sector discount rates, then we will
discuss social discount rates.
Review of the Literature
There seem to be four candidates for public sector
discount rates: Social Time Preference Rate, Private
Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate, Social Opportunity Cost
of Capital and Marglin's Discount Rate.
2.1 Social Time Preference Rate
The Social Time Preference Rate (STPR) is considered
as the rate in which society exhibits a preference for
present benefits over future benefits that are certain.
Since the benefits are represented by the changes in
consumption brought about by projects, the STPR can
be said to be an articulation by the society concerning
the relative value of a future year's consumption relative
to this year's consumption. Therefore, the proponents
of the STPR argue this is the discount rate to apply
to the society's future benefits, hence, the public
sector should accept projects which will be justified
when discounted by this rate. It is a very straightforward
argument. However, two problems with this approach
are pointed out in the literature. The first involves
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measuring the STPR and the second involves the efficiency
of the resource allocation. They will be examined next.
Market Interest Rate
Remember the Fisher's solution discussed in Chapter II
where, in the equilibrium, the market interest rate
(in real terms) is equal to the optimal marginal rate
of return on investment as well as to the tangent
of the indifference curve. So in this little world,
the market interest rate is equal to the rate of social
time preference. In the complex real world, the after-tax
interest rate on long-term government bonds may be a
good indicator of the STPR, since this rate reflects
individuals' willingness to make risk-free loans, and
hence, their time preferences. However, this is a subject
of controversy.
First, individuals may not express their true time
preferences concerning future consumption in the market.
They tend to be myopic, as Pigou argued, and they may
underestimate the pleasure which future consumption will
give them.19 Furthermore, their preferences expressed
as individuals may not be the same as their preferences
expressed when they see themselves as part of a society.
Thus it is probable that society as a whole may have a
lower rate of time. preference than the observed market
rates which reflect individuals' myopia.2 0
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Secondly, there is a question whether we should
consider a project's effects on the welfare of future
generations. Most economists would say no, on the grounds
that cost-benefit analysis should be democratic. 2 1
However, if one believes cost-benefit analysis should be
based on what is right, it is difficult to think of any
ethical justification for ignoring future generations.
It seems reasonable to use a lower discount rate than
the market interest rate to take into account the welfare
of future generations, especially when we evaluate a
project which will result in irreversible externalities
such as the destruction of a beautiful recreational area.
Social Inter-temporal Utility Function
Based on the assumption that we can draw a social
indifference curve of the utility of inter-temporal
consumption U(c), and that the principle of diminishing
marginal utility of consumption holds, it is argued that
(1) the future benefits to society have to be discounted
since in the future society is likely to have higher
income/wealth; (2) it will be possible to estimate the
STPR directly if the rate of growth of consumption and
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption
22
with respect to consumption are known. However, this
approach may not be reliable, since (1) it seems extremely
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difficult to find the value of the elasticity of
consumption; (2) it assumes the possibility of inter-
personal comparisons of utility.
Consequently, we examined the two main alternative
approaches for measuring the STPR. Since the second
approach does not seem practical, we will take the market
interest rate as a starting point for a measure of the
STPR. Both "myopic" and "future generation" arguments
suggest downward adjustment to the market interest rate.
Impact on Efficient Resource Allocation
It is shown that the STPR can be approximated by
the after-tax market interest rate on risk-free long-term
government bonds. In Fisher's model the STPR also equals
the marginal rate of return on investment. However, in
reality, the existence of personal/corporate income tax
and risk requires private before-tax rates of return on
investment significantly higher than the market risk-free
interest rate. This fact raises the question whether
there will occur over-investment in lower return projects
at the expense of higher return private projects if the
public sector uses the STPR or at risk-free market
interest rate as a discount rate which is significantly
lower than the private before-tax rates of return. If
it occurs, it will bring about inefficient resource
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allocation. This argument leads us to the second
position supporting the usage of the private discount
rate.
2.2. Private Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate
The above "inefficiency" argument suggests that it
will be necessary to use the private discount rate for
public investment evaluations to avoid inefficiency.
Whenever capital constraints exist this position has
the strong case. It has another attractiveness in
that it takes the risk of a project into account.
Hirshleifer argues that in perfect capital markets
investments are discounted with respect to both time and
risk, and that the discount rates obtaining in these
markets should be used to evaluate public investment
23
projects. This is a strong statement that the public
sector has to consider the risks of projects in the same
way as the private sector does.
Concerning risk, Samuelson and Vickerey, opposing
Hirshleifer's view, argue that the government invests
in a greater number of diverse projects and is able to
"pool" risks to a much greater extent than private
investors. Therefore, the government should ignore
uncertainty and behave as if it were indifferent to
risk. 24
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The other view of risk, raised by Arrow and Lind, 2 5
argues that when the risks associated with a public
investment are publicly borne, the total cost of risk-
bearing is insignificant, and that, therefore, the
government should ignore uncertainty in evaluating
public investments.
Conflicts among different views to risk need to
be discussed further.
2.3 Risk and Public Sector Investment Problem
In this paper, the "society" is assumed to be
a collection of individual members, and thus to have a
similar attitude toward risk as an individual (i.e. is
a risk-averse expected utility maximizer). From this
point of view, Hirshleifer's view seems most acceptable
although the view by Arrow and Lind seems correct as
an observation. Actually individuals are not very
concerned about risk-return characteristics of public
projects and few people may think of tax payments as
an investment for future benefits. However, it is not
ethical to argue that the public sector can neglect
individuals' risk-return preferences because they are
not concerned about the risks of public investment
projects. Suppose the society faces the choice between
two projects with the same expected return, but different
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risks. If all members of the society agree to choose
the one with less risk, the society should choose the
same one. This choice will increase each individual's
utility, and hence, social welfare.
Thus, it seems appropriate to use private risk-
adjusted discount rates for public project evaluation,
since the private risk-adjusted discount rate is
determined so that it reflects individuals' risk-return
preferences correctly, and hence, it can help individuals
reach right investment decisions which, in general, will
give them the highest utility.
The view by Samuelson and Vickerey is correct
only if all the risks can be eliminated by diversification.
However, it has been shown that systematic risks cannot
be eliminated through the diversifications within an
economy. Even a government, unless investing in outside
economies, may not be able to diversify systematic
risks away. Consequently, it is suggested that the Capital
Asset Pricing Model which measures only systematic risks
to find a projects' discount rate also seems appropriate
to use in public investment evaluation.
Although it is shown that the public sector should
evaluate the risk factor in the same way as the private
sector there remains one problem. That is, the private
discount rate may not be appropriate as a social discount
46
rate since the private economy does not use the prices
which reflect the true social value of goods and services.
Hence, the social discount rates may look significantly
different from the discount rates in the private market.
For example, suppose a private industry drains pollutants
into a river without paying. Real social costs have to
include the cost of this negative externality and
including these costs may affect the industry's business
risk significantly and thus may affect its discount rate.
Finally, it should be noted that discount rates to
be used by the public sector should be after-tax private
risk-adjusted discount rates, since they are the only
rates which will reflect the risk characteristics of
cash flows generated by projects. When we. want to
calculate the present value of a public project, we simply
discount its before-tax cash flow by an after-tax
discount rate which reflects the risk of the project.
When we want to know the after-tax present value of this
project, which is the value to the private sector,
we should adjust the cash flow as if taxes are paid but
should not double the after-tax discount rates and use
this doubled rate as abefore-tax discount rate. To
adjust discount rates is generally incorrect except that
a cash flow is perpetual and uniform.
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2.4 Social Opportunity Cost of Capital
The social opportunity cost of capital (SOCC) is
considered to be the cost of capital for financing public
investments. Depending on the assumptions made about the
level of capital constraints and the source of funds, the
social opportunity cost of capital takes differenct values:
1. If the public sector can accept all projects
which should be done because of no capital constraints,
the SOCC is 1.
Since the public sector does not face any capital
constraints on investments, the public investment projects
do not displace any private projects which could yield at
(P) before-tax rate of return. They just displace current
consumption. So only the stream of benefits (consumption
generated) in the future will be discounted at the rate
which reflects the social time preference (r).
NPV= B
r
where B = perpetual benefit stream
I = initial investment
2. If there are serious capital constraints, the
SOCC is (P )
r
In this case it is fair to assume that public
investments will displace the same amount of private
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investments which would have a rate of return (P) . The
SOCC is the present value of this foregone rate of return
to society for perpetuity ( r
r
NPV= B P
r r
If we only want to know if NPV > 0 or not, the formula
may change to
r B
r NPV= B-P P
where P can be regarded as a discount rate.
3. (The most general case.) If some portions of
private investment will be displaced, the SOCC is
e r + (1 - 0)
r-
where 0 is the rate of displacement of private investments
whether by taxation or borrowing. In the case of tax
financing 0 will be a marginal propensity of savings and
in the case of borrowing 0 will be approximately 1.
NPV = B 1 0 P + (1 - 0)
r r
This SOCC approach, used by some economists (Marglin,
etc.) and practiced by many governments, is essentially
analogous to the "company's cost of capital" method in
financial analyses, which measures the costs of financing
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to a firm and uses it as a discount rate to evaluate a
company's projects. The cost of financing is a weighted
average of a long-term debt interest rate and a required
rate of return on equity. However, the "company's cost
of capital" method may lead a company to wrong investment
decisions, since this method does not consider the risk
of a project.
It can give an appropriate discount rate only for
a project where risk characteristics are exactly the
same as a company's business as well as financial risk.
Eventually the company may be undertaking poor performance
high-risk projects while rejecting super low-risk projects.
The correct procedure is to follow the rule shown
in the previous section. In short, calculate the
required expected rate of return by the CAPM and use
it as a discount rate. The cost of financing has nothing
to do with the business risk and it should be assessed
separately from the project evaluation.
Consequently, although the SOCC measures the
opportunity cost of capital for public investments in an
acceptable way, using it as a discount rate will result
in undertaking many projects with a high expected rate
of return but also a high risk and giving up many good
projects with a relatively low expected rate of return
but a minimal risk. This is obviously not desirable for
the society.
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2.5 Marglin's Discount Rates
This position rejects the notion that individual
preferences as revealed by market behavior are significant
for government investment decisions. Marglin argues
that market-determined rates of investment and interest,
even rates determined in a competitive market, need have
no normative significance, and that the optimal level of
investment for an economy is the level at which the marginal
productivity of investment equals the marginal social
rate of discount incorporating external effects. 2 6
Assuming the imperfect market mechanism, this position
asserts that government should set the public sector
discount rate so that the economy can achieve the optimal
level of investment with respect to the national policy.
One such procedure, suggested by Marglin, would be to
set national objectives concerning the desired rate of
growth and to infer from this the appropriate rate of
discount, which is the social rate of discount.
Although attractive in that it attempts to realize
the optimal economy, this position is criticized both as
authoritarian and impractical by Preset and Turvey.2 7
They argue that Marglin's discount rate is based on the
assumptions that (1) the capital market mechanism is
extremely imperfect, (2) individuals are myopic, thus
their preferences are of no normative significance,
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(3) society is more than a collection of individuals and
has an existence and interests apart from those of
individual members, (4) the government has a superior
ability to find the real need and preference of the
society, and (5) the risk of a project is irrelevant.
Since none of the assumptions seem acceptable, the
criticism by Prest and Turvey sounds reasonable.
2.6 Social Discount Rates
As we have seen, there are four positions about how
to determine appropriate discount rates for public
investments projects. Some of them can be termed as
"public sector discount rates" since projects are
implicitly assumed to be undertaken by the public sector.
On the other hand, "social discount rates" means the
discount rates to be used for evaluation of projects --
either public or private-- from society's point of view.
Social Discount Rate
Social discount rates will be appropriate for the
social cost benefit analysis, since in both cases
socity's point of view matters. From society's point
of view it does not matter who undertakes a project --
the public sector or the private sector -- but it matters
how efficiently resources are allocated.
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This efficiency issue brings us back to the question
of the Social Time Preference Rate vs. the Private
Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate. It has been suggested that
the private discount rate can help avoid the potential
inefficient resource allocation resulting from using
the STPR. However, one problem has been pointed out, that
is, the private discount rate may not be adequate because
of the distortion in the market prices and externalities.
Consequently, to achieve the optimal efficiency we need
the social risk-adjusted discount rate as well as the
true social value of benefits and costs. If you use
the market prices and discount them by the private
risk-adjusted discount rate, this will bring about an
old problem: economic efficiency vs. social welfare. Many
benefits from welfare programs do not have market prices
and hence the benefits are underestimated. To apply the
private discount rate for this benefits stream will worsen
the underestimation. Therefore using the private discount
rate implies a value judgment which prefers more economic
efficiency to more social welfare.
How to measure the social risk-adjusted discount
rate poses a difficult problem. In the scope of this
paper, we cannot expect to do more than point out that
the social risk adjusted discount rate must be more than
the social time preference rate, depending on the risk
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of a project, but it may or may not be the same as the
private risk-adjusted discount rate. The difference
between the social and private risk-adjusted discount
rate for a project will depend on the extent to which
the project reflects the true social value of costs and
benefits.
Public Sector Discount Rate
The public sector discount rate is considered to
be an appropriate discount rate for public investment
project evaluation. In the case of a project done by
the government, the public sector discount rate is equal
tothe social sector discount rate, since we can assume
the government should be concerned about the society as
a whole. However inadequacy of the social cost of
capital and the Marglin's discount rate should be noted.
In the case of a project done by a local government,
since a local government cannot be said to be as
responsible for society as a whole, we might need the
different rate from the social discount rate. As
discussed in Chapter II, a local government is primarily
concerned about the welfare of its constituency. It
is competing with other local governments for people and
industries by improving its public services and amenities.
This has been the justification for thinking its budget
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surplus important. Alhtough it may not be desirable,
in practice a local government measures costs and
benefits by the market prices.
These characteristics of a local government suggest
that it use the private risk-adjusted discount rate, since
it will give the higher economic efficiency. Furthermore,
it is likely to be true that the local taxpayers are very
much influenced by the return from a local government;
because they always can move to a better locality in
terms of rate of return on their investment (i.e. local
public services vs. tax payment) . This taxpayers-local
government relation is exactly analogous to shareholders-
private firm relation. Consequently, using the private
risk-adjusted discount rates, is again suggested.
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CHAPTER IV
APPLICATION TO AN URBAN REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Urban redevelopment is an area where the public
sector and the private sector interact intensively with
each other. Within the public sector there are two
different interests, represented by a local government
(or a city) and the State/Federal government. We are to
apply the previous three project evaluation methods to
an urban redevelopment project and examine how they
result in different evaluations and how their difference
affects the decision making processes.
In this chapter, specific analytical models for an
urban redevelopment project are introduced with some
modifications to the general models presented before.
In the next chapter a case study is presented to show
how to actually apply the specific analytical models.
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1. Private Project Evaluation to an
Urban Redevelopment Project
1-1. Characteristics of Real Estate Investments
A real estate investment, in general, has the
following characteristics:
- Project life is usually very long.
- A large amount of loan financing is available
(e.g. mortgages). Thus an equity investment
in a project is usually a very small portion
of the total investment necessary, which is
called a "leveraged" equity position.
- Large tax losses raised by excess depreciation
and interest payment will be available.
- Every real estate investment has a unique nature.
- Return from real estate investment is generally
considered to be less volatile than common
stocks. 28
- Sophisticated investment analysis is rarely
used.
The availability of large tax losses is the most
distinctive, and often attractive, characteristics of
a real estate investment. The contribution of tax losses
can sometimes be much larger, hence more important than
one of after-tax cash flows from operations. Hence
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in order to fully utilize large tax losses and a leveraged
equity position, various forms of financing packages and
ownerships have been devised.
A typical proforma cash flow statement of a real
estate investment looks like as follows. This is called
"set-up."
Set-up
Gross Rentals
+ Other Incomes
Gross Revenue
Vacancies
Effective Gross
- Operating Expenses
- Property Tax
Free & Clear Cash Flow
- Debt Services
Before-Tax Cash Flow
1-2. Adjusted Present Value Method
From a real estate developer's point of view, it is
necessary to analyze properly the effects of complex
financial arrangements. This complexity of financial
considerations is one of the most distinctive features of
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real estate development projects. The revised version
of the Net Present Value method, called the Adjusted
Present Value method (APV), can give us a straightforward
approach to analyzing the interactions of financing and
investment decisions. Based on the principle of value-
additivity, the APV method essentially separates the
cash flow depending on the risk profile of each cash
stream, then adds them up after discounting with the
appropriate discount rates. First, this method starts by
estimating a project's "base case" value as an all equity
financed case, and then adjusts the project's base case
NPV to account for the project's financial side effects
such as the interest tax shield and the value of any
subsidizing loans. 2 9
Project _ Base Case + Present Value of
APV NPV Financing Side Effects
where:
Base Case NPV is the after-tax cash flow when a
project is assumed to be all equity financed, thus,
discounted by 6 asset (see Chap. III) .
Present value of Financing Side-Effects consists of
the present value of the interest tax shield, the
subsidizing loans, etc., each disounted by the borrowing
interest rate since they are as risky as interest payments.
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The APV method can be said to be the best so far
devised to evaluate a project with a complex financial
arrangement, since the APV method enables us to handle
the interaction between financing and investment decisions
in a straightforward fashion. That is, one first
focusses only on the business risk of a project and
determine its basic viability. Then one considers
financing strategy and finds the present value of
financing side effects. There is no formula unfortunately
for a single-adjusted discount rate that will correctly
reflect the financing and investment decision interaction.
2. The Application of Social Cost Benefit Analysis to
an Urban Redevelopment Project
Social Cost Benefit Analysis requires us to identify
real (not just distributional) social costs and benefits
brought about by a project and to measure them in terms
of real social values. In the case of an urban
redevelopment project, there seem to be three main
sources of benefits: (1) increased land value of the
site, (2) positive externalities (e.g., increased land
values of nearby property, and reduction in social costs),
(3) benefits from improvements (e.g., buildings, streets,
etc.). On the other hand, there seem also to be three
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categories of costs: (1) resource costs for improvements,
(2) the value of existing improvements that are demolished,
(3) negative externalities (e.g. traffic congestion).
The main benefit from redevelopment is considered to
be increased land value of the site. However, it is not
easy to measure correctly the benefit of the project,
since the increase in the land value comes from three
sources. The first is the "internalization of
externalities", which implies the land value on the
project site will increase due to the increased
productivity of the site resulting from re-assembly of
the land. For example, an urban redevelopment can
provide a large site by assembling small fragmented
parcels of land. It will open up new additional
productive opportunities for the site which were
previously prevented by fragmented land use. This is a
real net benefit.
The second source of increased value is changes in
relative prices of property caused by changes in the
supply of property. For example, if an urban redevelopment
project eliminates slum houses and supplies high-middle
income houses, the supply of slum houses decreases. This
results in the increase in the price of slum houses.
Consequently, the total of the effects may be canceled
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out within an economy. This is a distributional effect
(sometimes called as "locational effect") and one of
the pecuniary effects discussed in Chapter II, which is
irrelevant to social cost benefit analysis.
The third comes from the increase in population and
income which cause land value increase. Since an urban
redevelopment project takes a long time from its planning
stage to its implementation, the population and income
effect may be significant. Not to subtract the increase
in land value due to this population and income effect
will overstate the benefits of the project.
Positive externalities take the form of (1) increased
land values of nearby property and (2) reduction in
social costs. Typical urban redevelopment projects
remove slum or blighted areas and replace them with
high-quality buildings. This improves the nieghborhood
for nearby property and enhances its productivity and
value. This is one of technological externalities
reflecting real benefits and "agglomeration effect" will
be another example of this sort. Reduction in social
costs brought by eliminating slum or undesirable land
usage is the other form of positive externalities.
Decrease in crime rates, decrease in fire hazards and
improvement in health hazards are major items to be counted.
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As to benefits from improvements, there are two
conflicting views. The first one, proposed by Rothenberg,
assumes that (1) the strict full-employment and
competitive economy and (2) movable resources (i.e., any
resources other than land) allocated to a project are
desplacing alternative resource uses in the same product
sector of the economy (e.g. , a housing sector, and
office building sector, etc.). The resources spent for
constructing improvements on a site are considered to
be movable resources thus deplacing alternative uses.
The assumption of the full-employment and competitive
economy implies that, at least within the same sector,
the marginal productivity of capital must be reduced to
become unique and if resources are used, they will yield
exactly this marginal productivity of capital since the
displaced alternative resource uses could have yield
at this rate elsewhere, and simultaneously, the
competition must have eliminated any alternative uses
with higher yield. This is the opportunity cost of
capital in this sector of the economy. Consequently, it
is argued that the resources used for improvements will
not produce any net benefits since that benefits should
be offset by the opportunity cost of the capital displaced
elsewhere. Hence, Rothenberg argues both benefits and
63
costs of improvements are irrelevant and any net benefits
will be capitalized on land.
The other view relaxes Rothenberg's second assumption,
allowing the inter-sectoral resource transfer as well as
disequilibrium due to imperfect competition. Now, the
marginal productivity of capital is not necessarily unique
since it will be quite different from one sector to the
other partly depending on risk characteristics. Therefore
the benefits and costs of improvements come into the
calculation. However, there are serious difficulties to
find the necessary data. By definition, the benefits of
improvements can be measured by the consumers willingness
to pay. Therefore the rent payments can be an indicator
of the benefits of improvements but, as we have seen
already, the market prices are poor indicators of real
social value of resources. Rather, real social values
should be measured and discounted by social risk-adjusted
discount rates. Hence, it is recommended to use social
(risk-adjusted) discount rates so as to capitalize
the rent. Furthermore, the benefits of public improvements
need to be measured although it is pointed out that no
successful methods have ever found.
Finally, the assumption of full-employment economy
allows us to exclude such benefits as a shadow price of
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labor, job/employment creation and multiplier effects.
ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK
Rothenberg's Model
[Benefits]
1. Increase in land value on site less locational and
income/population effects.
2. Increase in land value on neighborhood less locational
and income/population effects.
3. Reduction in social costs.
[Costs]
1. Value of existing improvements to be demolished.
2. Negative externalities.
Alternative Model
[Benefits]
1. Capitalized rent for land and building.
2. Increase in land value on neighborhood less locational
and income/population effects.
3. Benefits from public improvements (e.g., streets,
sewage systems, parks, etc.)
4. Reduction in social costs.
[Costs]
1. Costs of land acquisition and administration of a
project.
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2. Costs of building construction.
3. Costs of public improvements.
4. Value of existing improvements to be demolished.
5. Negative externalities.
3. The Application of Economic Impact Assessment to an
Urban Redevelopment Project
Applicaiton of the Economic Impact Assessment to an
urban redevelopment project is straightforward.
1. Figure out required public costs for land
acuisition, demolition, and construction of
improvements. Financial costs for debt financing
and tax loss from demolition of existing
improvements are also costs.
2. Estimate the increase in property value after
completion of a project or the rent of office,
retail, residential and hotel, etc., when
percentage rent is used to calculate the property
30
tax. Apply appropriate tax rates to find after-
project tax revenues. The disposition price to
a developer also needs to be estimated.
3. Calculate the number of construction and other
jobs generated and find the multiplier effect on
the local economy. This is considered additional
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CHAPTER V
A CASE STUDY -- A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
An urban redevelopment project -- PARK PLAZA Urban
Renewal Project in downtown Boston will be analyzed by
the three project evaluation methods with numerical
calculations. Sensitivity analysis in terms of different
discount rate assuptions as well as other policy variables
are done to see the implications of different assumptions
for the decision making process.
It should be noted, however, that this case study is
not intended as a rigorous empirical application of the
methods suggested in this paper. The difficulties to
obtain necessary data make it impossible to arrive at
definite conclusions. As an illustrative exercise, it
is intended to provide the general directions of how
to calculate necessary numbers and how to interpret
numerical results.
1. PARK PLAZA Urban Renewal Project
PARK PLAZA Urban Renewal Project in downtown Boston
is one of the largest urban redevelopment projects planned
by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (B.R.A.) . Aimingat the
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revitalization of underutilized downtown area where the
spread of blight and erosion of property value can be
observed, this project has a comprehensive development
plan, including new residential, office, retail,
entertainment, and hotel development. (See Appendix 1
for the summary description of the project.) As a case
project, we will choose a private office development on
the Arlington-Hadassah sub-parcel, assuming that we were
examining the project at the end of 1975.
SUMMARY DATA
(Unless otherwise noted, the data used in this
section are from Park Plaza Urban Renewal Project/
Final Supplemental Impact Report: The Report, Sept.
1976, by the B.R.A.)
Arlington-Hadassah Sub-Parcel 65,4.07 S.F.
12.4% of Total Site
Disposition Price $5,201,000
Office Building 570,000 S.F.
Office 515,000 S.F.
46% of Total Office
(Net Rentable S.F. = 87% of Gross S.F.= 448,050 S.F.)
Retail 55,000 S.F.
35% of Total Retail
Development Cost
Office $74/Net Rentable S.F. x 448,050 = 33,155,700
Retail $63/N.R.S.F. x 55,000 = 3,465,000
$ 36,620,700
$74/N.R.S.F. and $63/N.R.S.F. both consist of
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$8/N.R.S.F. of land cost, construction costs, debt
service and real estate taxes during construction
period, administration, etc.
Revenue (per Net Rentable Square Footage)
Office Retail
Gross Rent $12.00 $12.00
Vacancy (.60) (1.20)
Effective Gross Rent 11.40 10.80
Operating Expenses (2.40) (1.60)
Real Estate Taxes (2.60) (2.70)
Free and Clear Cash Flow 6.40 6.50
2. Private Project Evaluation (The APV Method)
We will evaluate the project from a private
estate develper's point of view.
real
2-1. Estimation of a Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate
Assuming that a developer's main. business is an
office development and his stock B = .98, Debt/Debt +
31
Equity = 15% and corporate income tax = 48%,
Equity
B~roect=S~tok .)= .98 x .92 = .90Project Stock Equity + (1 - .48) Debt
Historical data (1926-74) of rates of return by Ibbotson
and Sinquefield suggests average annual rate of return
(real) of Treasury bills (risk-free rate) equals .2%32
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and of common stock over treasury bill return (risk
premium) equals 8.6%. Using the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, the risk-adjusted discount rate is:
r Project = + Project(rM - i)= .2% + .9(8.6%)= 8%
2-2. APV Method
BASE CASE NPV consists of operating cash flow NPV,
Depreciation Tax Shield and Present Value of Resale.
PROJECT _ BASE CASE + Interest
APV NPV Tax Shield
Operating Cash+Depreciation +Present Value]
Flow NPV Tax Shield of Resale
+ Interest
Tax Shield
OPERATING CASH FLOW NPV can be found by (1) calculat-
ing after-tax but before depreciation and debt service
operating cash flow discounted by rProject' (2) then
subtracting initial costs. Life of the office building is
assumed to be 40 years.
After-Tax but Before Depreciation and Debt Serice Cash Flow
= $6.40/N.R.S.F. x (1 - .48) = $3.33/N.R.S.F.
40
OPERATING CASH - R40 3.33
FLOW NPV(Office) ( -74/N.R.S.F. + t
~t(l + .03)t
= -74 + 39.71 = -34.29/N.R.S.F.
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considered to be as risky as interest payments, the
discount rate can also be approximated by the mortgage
interest rate. 10% nominal is chosen.
INTEREST TAX SHIELD can be found by (1) finding out
each year's interest payment it, (2) calculating the
present value of interest payment stream, and (3) multi-
plying (marginal) corporate income tax rate. Assume:
mortgage loan is $51/N.R.S.F. which is 80% of capitalized
Free & Clear Cash Flow at 10% capitalized rate; interest
rate is 9.5% nominal; and repayment term is 30 years.33
30 48i
INTEREST TAX = ' t = 17.62/N.R.S.F.
SHIELD t (1 + .10)t
RESALE VALUE is calculated based on the assumption
that (1) the building will be sold at the same price as
the current depreciable base ($66/N.R.S.F.), and
(2) capital gain tax ratio is 35%.
66 x (1 - .35)
RESALE VALUE = 40 = .94/N.R.S.F.
(1 + .10)
PROJECT _ Operating Cash + Depreciation + Present Value
APV(Office) Flow NPV Tax Shield of Resale
+ InterestTax Shield
= -34.29 + 8.64 + 17.62 + .94 = - 7.09/N.R.S.F.
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By the same procedure:
PROJECT a= -22.69 + 7.2 + 17.95 + .78 = 3.24/N.R.S.F.
APV(Retail)
Consequently,
APV of Office Development = -7.09/N.R.S.F. x 448,050
$ -3,176,674
APV of Retail Development = 3.24/N.R.S.F. x 55,000
178,200
TOTAL $ -2,998,474
It is amazing to find that this project would cost a
developer about three million deficit.
2-3. Sensitivity Analysis
If rr> 6.76%, PROJECT APV < 0
Project
r
Project < 6.76%, PROJECT APV > 0
Other variables being equal, rProject (= 6.76%)
corresponds to Po (= .76) . Hence, if this projectProject
is less risky than 6 = .76, PROJECT APV becomes positive.
It may be concluded that this project is not
attractive from a private developer's point of view,
since the assumption that the business risk of office
development is higher than 6 = .76 seems reasonable.
However, it should be pointed out that we use real rates
to discount cash flow so that we do not have to consider
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DEPRECIATION TAX SHIELD is the present value of the
corporate income tax saved by depreciation since
depreciation is tax deductable. This cash flow has
different risk characteristics from the operating cash
flow, that is, the only risk associated with this cash
flow is the one that a firm cannot make use of it.
However, in the real estate business, investors can make
use of depreciation tax shields even if a firm cannot.
Consequently, this cash flow involves only a small risk
and an appropriate discount rate can be approximated by
the mortgage interest rate. 10% nominal is chosen as a
discount rate. Depreciation tax shield can be calculated
by (1) figuring out each year's depreciation Dt'
(2) calculating the present value of the depreciation stream,
and (3) multiplying (marginal) corporate income tax
rate. Assume:150% declining balance method over 40 years;
depreciable basis is $66/N.R.S.F. which is $73/N.R.S.F.
less land cost $8/N.R.S.F.
DEPRECIATION 49 .48Dt 8.64/N.R.S.F.
TAX SHIELD (1 .4.RSF
t (1 + .10)t
INTEREST TAX SHIELD is the present value of the
corporate income tax saved by interest payments because
interest is tax deductable. Since this cash flow can be
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effects of inflation. However, the value of real estate
often rises more than the rate of inflation, which gives
investors extra cash flows. The preceding analysis does not
take this fact into account; thus, the result should be
a conservative figure.
3. Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
Due to the difficulty of obtaining necessary data,
the analysis is simplified. The following are the
assumptions introduced:
(1) Benefits from improvements will not be counted
as Rothenberg does not. All the benefits are
assumed to be capitalized on the land.
(2) Income/population effects and locational effects
on property value are negligible.
(3) Costs and benefits from public improvements
will be canceled out with each other.
(4) Positive and negative externalities will be
canceled out with each other.
Under these assumptions, benefits is the capitalized rent
for only land; costs consist of building construction and
the value of existing improvements to be demolished.
[COSTS]
The cost figures, $74/N.R.S.F. for office and $63/
74
N.R.S.F. for retail, include property taxes during
construction periods, $2.20/N.R.S.F. and 2.40/N.R.S.F., 34
respectively. Since the land cost is $8/N.R.S.F. the real
capital costs are $63.8/N.R.S.F. and $52.6/N.R.S.F.
Office 63.8/N.R.S.F. x 448,080 = 28,585,590
Retail 52.6/N.R.S.F. x 55,000 = 2,893,000
SUB-TOTAL 31,478,590
Existing Improvements Demolished 967,000
32,445,590
[BENEFITS]
Effective gross rent for the land and building is
$11.40/N.R.S.F. for office and $10.80/N.R.S.F. for retail.
These figures include operating expenses, $2.40/N.R.S.F.
and $1.50/N.R.S.F., and property taxes, $2.60/N.R.S.F.
and $2.70/N.R.S.F., respectively. Since, in general, tax
payments are not considered as real costs and benefits,
the benefits to society depend on the following assumptions:
(1) If property taxes are born by occupants/consumers,
the real benefit = 11.40 - 2.40 - 2.60 =
6.40/N.R.S.F. for office and 6.50/N.R.S.F. for
retail.
(2) If property taxes are born by property owners,
the real benefit = 11.40 - 2.40 = 9.00/N.R.S.F.
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for office and 9.2/N.R.S.F. for retail.
Traditionally, it is believed that a tax on real
estate improvements is shifted forward to occupiers.
However, it is now controversial. 3 5
In order to capitalize the benefit, we have to choose
discount rates. As it is suggested, social discount rate
should be between after-tax private risk-adjusted discount
rate and the social time preference. To achieve as high
economic efficiency as the private sector does, after-tax
private discount rate should be used for adjusted cash
flows, or only in case of perpetual and uniform cash flows,
doubled after-tax discount rate can be used for unadjusted
cash flow. Since real estate generates a perpetual stream
of cash flows, we can use 8% x 2 = 16% to get after tax
present value of the project, assuming corporate income
tax is approximately 50%. The STPR can be approximated
by the historical after-tax rate of return (1926-1974) on
long term government bonds which is 1.3%(real).
CAPITALIZED VALUE (OFFICE)
Benefit $6.40 $9.0
Double Rate 16% 40 56.25
After-tax Discount Rate 8% 80 112.5
Social Time Preference 1.3% 492 692
Social Cost 63.8 63.8
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
We will examine whether benefits less capital costs
exceed the initial land price,i.e., the disposition price
of $5,201,000. If the benefit is $6.40, the discount rate
of 10.24% equates the land value (benefit) and the land
cost (cost). If the benefit is $9.00, the discount rate
of 14.40% equates the cost and the benefit. Consequently,
if the benefit is $9, the benefit exceeds the cost in
most circumstances. If the benefit is $6.4, the project
will be justified if the discount rate is assumed to be
lower than 10.24% without taxes. If the STPR is used as
a discount rate, both $9 and $6.4 cases will be justified,
while this project is infeasible under both cases if the
public sector has to be as efficient as the private sector.
Since the project is justified at 8% risk-adjusted discount
rate which is appropriate for this project, and the social
discount rate is suggested to be lower than the private
rate, it may be concluded that the benefit is likely to
exceed the cost from society point of view.
Furthermore, if positive externalities, such as the
reduction in crime rates and the real increase in land
value on nearby property, exceed negative externalities,
such as serious traffic congestions and increased noise
level, the project becomes worth more.
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4-4 Economic Impact Assessment
Assuming that disposition price of land to a
developer is set so that it will be equal to costs of
land acquisition and administration of a project, and
that the increase in land value in nearby property will
be canceled out by the decrease in land value elsewhere
within a local economy, the benefit is the increased
property tax revenues on the site which is the difference
between new property tax revenues and the previous
property tax revenues. The costs are the one of
constructing public improvements (e.g. parks, streets,
and plazas,etc.), and the increase in public services
(e.g. fire protection)
[BENEFITS]
Property taxes are 23% and 25% of the effective
gross rent of the new office and retail, respectively. 3 6
Office 23% x ll.40/N.R.S.F. = 2.6/N.R.S.F. x 448,056
1,164,930
Retail 25% x 10.80/N.R.S.F. = 2.7/N.R.S.F. x 55,000
148,500
Total Anual Property Tax 1,313,430
The property tax revenues before the project needs to be
figured out and subtracted from the above figure to find
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net increase in property tax revenues. The assessed value
of the property on Arlington/Hadassah in 1974 is equal
to $2,076,000 including land and buildings. Property tax
rate is 196.7/1000.
Annual Foregone Tax Revenues = 2,076,000 x 196.7/1000
= 408, 349
The Net Increase in Property Tax Revenues (Annual)
= 1,313,430 - 408,349 = 905,081
[COSTS]
The total cost of public investments amounts to
5,440,000. The proportional allocation of the total cost
to this office building is done according to the share
of this building's square footage to the total development
square footage, which is 25%.
The Share of Public Improvements
= 5,440,000 x 25% = 1,360,000
The cost of public services are also proportionally
allocated according to the share of this building's square
footage to the total development square footage of each use,
which is 46% and 35% for office use and retail use,
respectively.
The Share of Public Service Costs (Annual)
Office 1,071,370 x 46% = 492,798
Retail 381,775 x 35% = 133,621
Total 626,419
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BENEFITS Property Tax Revenues 905,081 (Annual)
COSTS Public Improvements 1,360,000
Public Services 626,419(Annual)
To find if the property brings positive NPV of benefits,
we will compare one time cost of 1,360,000 with annual
flow of benefit: 905,081 - 626,419 = 278,662. Capitalized
value of the annual cash flow is the present value of
perpetual equity. In this case, the public sector discount
rate, which must be as high as the private sector, can be
approximated by the double after-tax discount rate.
BENEFIT COST
Private Discount Rate 16% 1,741,637 1,360,000
NPV of the benefit 391,637
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
If discount rate = 20,5%, then NPV of the benefit = 0.
If the cost of public improvements is financed at 7%
over 20 years, as is assumed in the Report, annual debt
service = 128,370,
(278,662 - 128,370) 1 278,662
NPV t + 20
(1 - .16) (1 + .16) .16
= 891,057 + 89,998 = 980,555
The net benefit becomes very large. Consequently, it is
obvious that this project should be realized from the city
of Boston point of view.
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TAX BREAK
Although the property tax rates are set at 23% and
25% of the effective gross rent of the new office and
retail, respectively, this assumes a tax break with
Proposition 121A. If we use the current effective rate
of 7% at the market value, city's tax revenues are:
7% x 74/N.R.S.F. x 448,050 = 2,320,899
7% x 63/N.R.S.F. x 55,000 = 242,550
2,563,449
- 1,313,430
1,250,019
This suggests that the city actually subsidizes 1.25
million to the private developer but it is still not
enough to change project's feasibility from the private
developer's point of view.
ADDITIONAL BENEFIT
The construction jobs which will be generated by
this building over three years is estimated by the
proportional allocation of total construction jobs of
each use.
(Million of $)
Office Retail Public TotalImprovementToa
Annual Payroll 1.01 .56 .2 1.77
Multiplier Effect 1.58 .18 .33 2.09
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Since income taxes are levied by the State and Federal
governments but not by the city of Boston, this multiplier
effect on the local economy may not be a direcL benefit
from the local government point of view.
2.09 3 1
PV of Multiplier Effect = -
3 1 (1 + .013)
= 2.04 million
where discount rate must be the Social Time Preference
since multiplier effect will create consumptions but not
investments.
4-5. Implications on Decision Making Processes
Clearly, our analysis concludes that this office
development project, one of PARK PLAZA Urban Renewal
Project, is not feasible from a private developer's point
of view, although it is a wonderful project from the
society and the city of Boston point of view. This
conclusion is quite insensitive to the choice of discount
rates. This is an unfortunate situation since the society
and a local government will miss the opportunity where
they get substantial benefits. From a private developer's
point of view, there is no point to accept this project
which will cost him three million. It is to this sort
of problem that this paper is trying to show the way to
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get around.
SOLUTION l
If the city decides to subsidize the developer, the
project will be undertaken.
The NPV of the Developer = -2,998,474 + 2,998,474 = 0
The Society: No Change
The city needs to raise $2,998,474 since the total cost
to the city becomes $4,358,474. The discount rate which
will give NPV = 0 is 6.4%. The city is now considering
the debt finance at 7% over 20 years; therefore, it seems
reasonable to expect that the city will use the discount
rate higher than 7%. Consequently, this solution will
not work. It suggests that that "zero-sum" relation
exists between the city and the private developer, that
is, one's gain means the other's loss. This is a common
observation in the real world. The city and the private
developer often spend a lot of their time and money in a
futile negotiation process, leading nowhere because of
the zero-sum relation between each other. Now we will
introduce the view from the society.
SOLUTION 2
If the private developer can be subsidized three
million dollars, the project will be undertaken. City of
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Boston can subsidize up to $980,555 -- the subsidy which
the State/Federal Government can provide depending on
the assumptions about discount rates. If we assume the
appropriate rate is 8% risk-adjusted discount rate, the
net social benefits are 8.8 million for the benefit of
$6.4/N.R.S.F. and 25.2 million for the benefit of
$9/N.R.S.F. These net benefits are enough to encourage
the private developer to undertake the project, solving
the problem between the city and the developer.
As is shown, the State/Federal subsidy which
represents the redistribution of social benefits can
effectively solve conflicts between the city and the
developer, resulting in everybody's better off. The
secret of this mechanism lies in that the problems between
the city and the developer are essentially distributional
and,hence, the results of the social cost benefit analysis
will not be affected by these problems. As long as the
society can obtain positive social benefits from a
project, it is always possible to pump the benefits into
the negotiation process between the city and the developer
so that they can settle conflicts. However, it should
be noted that the amount of the State/Federal subsidy has
to be equal to the difference between the city's gain and
the developer's loss. Otherwise, both of the city and the
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developer might obtain excess gain which results in an
unfair income distribution.
The society may not always gain and if it loses, it
is a different story. Suppose this office development
project will bring the positive NPV for both the city and
the developer. However, it causes a terrible traffic jam
in Boston and simultaneously causes the displacement of
a suburban office park. The social cost benefit analysis
may reveal substantial social costs,incurred by this
project. In this case, the project should not be accepted.
In summary, we have seen how a project can be assessed
differently depending on the point of view. The case study
suggests that the problems which appear almost impossible
to be settled between the city and the private developer
can be effectively solved by taking account of the society
point of view. Also the danger of neglecting the society
point of view has been pointed out. To reach right
decisions, it therefore seems necessary to understand all
of the three project evaluation methods. Finally, it
should be noted that this illustrative case study is by
no means complete, since non-market items (i.e. exter-
nalities, intangibles and public goods) are not included
in the calculations despite that these non-market items
may explain the major differences between the social value
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and the private market prices of resources. However,
to do so is beyond the scope of this paper since it is
extremely difficult to measure these items. If we can
obtain the necessary data, our analysis will be more
accurate and significant, but the general directions of
the process to be followed and the interpretation of
numerical results should be the same as introduced in
this chapter.
86
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the observation that project evaluation
methods differ depending on the point of view, the central
concern of this paper has been how the different evaluation
methods lead to the different results and what the
implication of the different evaluation results will be
to the decision making process about a project which
involves intensive interactions between the private sector
and the public sector. Three distinctive project
valuation methods are identified: Net Present Value method,
Social Cost Benefit Analysis, and Economic Impact
Assessment.
The NPV method, often used by private firms, enables
them to achieve the most efficient resource allocation to
realize the firms's maximum market value, and thereby
help firms' shareholders reach their maximum utility.
The social cost benefit analysis representing society
point of veiw can also help society/economy approach to
the optimal level of economic efficiency. However,
different from the NPV method, it is pointed out that
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the economic efficiency maximum does not necessarily
coincide with the society's utility maximum -- i.e.,
"social welfare" maximum due to income/wealth distribution
problems. This paper agrees to the position that the
social cost benefit analysis should be confined to.
consideration of economic efficiency and income/wealth
distribution problems should be handled separatly by
other analytical methods. It is because that the choice
between economic efficiency and fair income/wealth
distribution is a matter of an individual's value judgement
and analytical methods should be free from any value
judgements. Unlike the previous two methods, it is agreed,
Economic Impact Assessment method does not have the
rationale on economic principles. Although it is sure
that a local government can improve its financial position
by accepting the "tax surplus" rule, it is not at all sure
if the rule can help its consistency achieve higher utility,
since an "external diseconomy" of one public action by a
local government may hurt another locality seriously and
vice versa, eventually making everybody worse off. This
is a source of sub-optimality. Therefore, this analytical
method should not be considered significant and should be
re-examined carefully in the light of economic principles.
The choice of discount rates are critical in any
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project evaluation methods, since evaluation results are
often sensitive to the value of discount rates. The
current finance theory has developed a rational
methodology to find the value of expected rates of return
on risky investments, which is called the Capital Asset
Pricing Model. The well functioning capital market
enables the model to provide fairly accurate estimate of
discount rates for risky projects. The value of discount
rate depends on risk characteristics of projects.
While the discount rates for the private sector can
be estimated reasonably well by this finance methodology,
the discount rates for the public sector are subjected to
economists' controversy. The extensive review of
literature has revealed the appropriate discount rates
from the society point of view, therefore for the social
cost benefit analysis, should lie somewhere between
private discount rates and the Social Time Preference Rate.
This "social discount rates" are considered to be risk-
adjusted discounted rates when goods and services including
non-market items such as externalities, intangibles and
public goods are priced so as to reflect their true social
value. No attempts have been made to estimate "social
discount rates"; but it must be considerably lower than
the private risk-adjusted rates. On the other hand, the
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Economic Impact Assessment method requires "public sector
discount rates" which are suggested to be the same as the
private risk-adjusted discount rates. Determined in this
way, discount rates work to help efficient resource
allocation be realized.
An urban redevelopment project is chosen as an
example to actually apply the three evaluation methods
since it usually involves intensive interaction among
private developers, a local government, and the society
represented by the State/Federal government. However,
three types of difficulties are revealed. At first,
there exists no satisfactory methodology to measure
non-market items (externalities, intangibles, and public
goods) although these items often account for the
difference between the private project evaluation and the
social cost benefit analysis. Second, no attempts have
ever been made to measure the "socail discount rates".
Finally, even if measurable, some necessary data are not
recorded or hard to obtain. The increase in land value
only due to a project is an example of data difficult to
obtain.
Consequently, the case study of PARK PLAZA Urban
Renewal Project in downtown Boston is merely an
illustrative exercise. The numbers calculated are of
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little significance. However, the case study provides
not only the general directions of analytical procedures
to be followed for each of three project evaluation
methods, but also very interesting analytical results.
That is, it is suggested that there exist "zero-sum"
relations between a private developer and a local
government who, in reality, interacts intensively with
each other in the decision making or negotiation process
of an urban redevelopment project. It is because of
this "zero-sum" relations which the negotiation process
is always tough and sometimes futile. Also important
is that this zero-sum relation has nothing to do with the
results of the Social Cost Benefit Analysis. Hence, when
a project will not generate enough benefits to satisfy
both a private developer and a local government, this
project will definitely be rejected at least by one party.
However, if the Social Cost Benefit Analysis shows large
positive benefits, the project should be undertaken from
the society point of view and will be undertaken by
pumping the excess social benefits to the negotiation
process between the two. This pumping process will be
called as State/Federal grant and subsidy.
On the other hand, it is also suggested that there
is a possibility that a project which is not justified
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by the Social Cost Benefit Analysis will be accepted by
the two, and there seems to be no effective means to
prevent them from accepting the project. This may serve
as another example of inappropriate aspects of the
Economic Impact Assessment method from the society point
of view.
This interesting findings suggest number of things.
First, to understand the basis of the Social Cost Benefit
Analysis as well as the Economic Impact Assessment method
will help a private firm predict the public sector
decision makings with great accuracy. It not only
reduces the risk of a project associated with the public
sector decision makings, thereby reduces time and money
spent in negotiation processes, but also ecnourages a
private firm to undertake more projects which will be
socially justified, since they are less risky in a sense
that the public sector will not interfere to them. It
will also open up the opportunity to undertake a project
which seems terrible from a private point of view but will
be justified socially. The State/Federal grant or subsidy
can change the terrible outlook to the bright one.
Secondly, a local government has to understand the
serious problems of its practice -- Economic Impact
Assessment. It should be realized that "tax surplus" rule
92
will not only ruin the desirable projects for the society
but also will make even its constituency worse off by the
accumulation of "external diseconomies" from public
actions. If it seriously considers maximizing its
constituency's utility to be its ultimate objectives, it
should adjust the rule.
Finally, it will be necessary to train managers,
planners, analysts or economists who can understand the
basis of all the project evaluation methods. Since they
can see the probable results of different evaluation
methods, they will not commit silly mistakes of accepting
a bad project and rejecting a good project from the
society point of view. Thus, they may be able to help
the society approach to the better welfare state,
simultaneously encouraging the private sector to
participate in this process.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE 1
Total Site 528,420 s.f.
Total Development
Retail
Hotel
Residential
Office
Parking
2,265,000
155,000
335,000
300,000
1,115,000
360,000
s.f.
Investment
$155,453,000
778,850
30,385,900
16,558,350
82,151,900
8,012,000
Time Span: 1977 -- 1983
Appendix, p. 95.
